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Abstract
One-child transnational families are the product of the “one-child” policy, access to
foreign travel, and the rise of a middle class that could afford overseas education for the
only child. One result was the possibility of the only child, following its Western-based
education, settling (semi)permanently in the host country. This situation raises the
issue of how the only child balances the opportunities in the West with the filial
responsibilities to ageing parents back in China. Recognising the diversity of family
forms, this study highlights the “human story” of ageing and intergenerational
relations in families split between China and the UK. Drawing on 40 interviews,
which included one-child migrants in the UK and some of their parents in China,
this article explores the views of both generations. The findings indicate that
international migration and increased family affluence did not lead to the erosion
of filial piety. However, the practice and perception of filial piety among these families
underwent a complex transition. Distance and borders posed future significant barriers
for parental long-term care. One-child migrants tended to compensate for the lack of
material/practical care by providing long-distance emotional care for their parents. Both
generations expressed ambivalence towards this new transnational family contract.
Instead of focusing on the practical outcomes, this article argues for the importance of
examining how the members of transnational families perceive their filial behaviour. This
focus brings out the less visible changing dynamics of intergenerational care in the
context of modernisation and globalisation.
Keywords: Ageing, Transnational family, Filial piety, Chinese migration, One-child family
Background
The late twentieth century marked the start of dramatic socioeconomic changes for
families in China. The post-1978 economic reform witnessed the rise of a new “middle
class” in China (Li 2010a). The increasing household wealth of this class was coupled
with sharply reduced family size as a result of the “one-child” policy initiated in 1979.
The “one-child” policy was officially ended in October 2015. However, the three and
half decades of policy implementation created a one-child generation and made the
three-member nuclear family the norm in urban China.
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The only child in middle-class families benefited from concentrated family resources.
With a desire for Western affluence (Li 2010a; Fong 2004) and the increasing opportunity
to go abroad, the number of Chinese students studying abroad has sharply increased since
the turn of the century (from 17,662 in 1998 to 38,989 in 2001 to 459,800 in 2014
[National Bureau of Statistics of China 2015]). The majority of overseas Chinese stu-
dents were postgraduate students in their 20s (Li 2010b) with the USA and the UK
being the two most popular destinations.
A large number of graduates remained in the host country and extended their stay
indefinitely. The PRC’s survey of the period 1978–2006 reported that 70 % of the
Chinese who went abroad as students remained overseas after graduation (Jiang
2009). The return rate remained lower than half until shortly before 2010 (National
Bureau of Statistics of China 2015). The increased return rate was the result of tight-
ened migration policies and limited job vacancies in most Western student-receiving
countries after the 2008 financial crisis, as well as expanding career opportunities in
China. The Annual Report on the Development of Chinese Returnees (2013) indi-
cated that among graduates aged between 24 and 30 who returned after studying
abroad in 2012, 90.9 % of them chose “to be near parents” as one of their main rea-
sons for returning (Wang and Miao 2013).
What about the one-child graduates who, for various reasons, did not return and
could not “be near parents”? What will happen (or is happening) to their relationship
with parents in China? Given the family-based parental long-term care in China, how
will traditional intergenerational practices, such as filial piety, be re-interpreted in a
long-distance family setting? The one-child transnational family phenomenon is a
unique “transnational social field” (Levitt and Schiller 2004) in which to examine ageing
and intergenerational relations in the context of modernisation and globalisation.
Filial piety and twenty-first century urban families
In Chinese families, the notion of filial piety has been the dominating “cultural logic”
for more than 2000 years (Zhan and Montgomery 2003). It is arguably one of the oldest
forms of family contract. The definition of filial piety in the twenty-first century varies
slightly according to different scholars in different contexts (Schans and de Valk 2011;
Chow and Chu 2007; Croll 2006; Ikels 2004). In general, filial piety requires children to
fulfil parent’s practical and financial/material needs and look after a parent’s emotional
well-being; it also traditionally prescribes obedience and respect from the younger to
the older generation regardless of an individual’s age (Keller et al. 2005).
However, findings in Asia from the late 1990s indicated a declining emphasis on rev-
erence and obedience but a trend towards renegotiating intergenerational filial expecta-
tions based on more egalitarian intra-familial exchanges (Croll 2006). The more recent
evidence suggests a gradual shift in filial practices from gender specific to relatively
gender flexible (Shi 2009; Xie and Zhu 2009; Wang 2004). Thus, filial piety and family
values should be understood in their specific sociocultural contexts (Hu and Scott 2014).
Outside the family, filial piety requires “conducting oneself so as to bring honor and
avoid disgrace to the family name” (Chow and Chu 2007, p. 93). Likewise, an individual’s
“filial demonstration” towards his/her parents establishes him/her as “a reliable, trust-
worthy and honourable person” in the eyes of others (Ikels 2004, p. 5; Whyte 2004). In
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contemporary Asia, urbanisation has reduced to some degree the direct enforcement of
filial piety by local patrilineal communities. Nevertheless, indirect social pressure to con-
form to the culturally prescribed filial norms is still pervasive, as the findings of this study
indicate.
Apart from families and communities, the state has promoted the traditional family
contract through legislation on children’s responsibility of parental care1 and minimising
the state’s role in long-term care for the elderly (Feng et al. 2011; Zhan et al. 2008). To
date, there is no functioning elderly care system in China. Long-term care institutions
have varied standards and policies. Government-funded care institutions accept only the
very desperate elderly (Wu et al. 2008), while high-quality (private) care homes cater for
only very affluent clients (Zhan et al. 2008).
A gap remains for the vast group in the middle: 90 % of the elderly still relied on fa-
milial care in 2012 (Zhang 2012). In 2014, there were more than 36 million bedridden
or semi-bedridden elderly people in China but only 356,000 care staff and 50,000 certif-
icated carers for the elderly (Wang and Tian 2015). These realities are likely to pose
long-term care problems even for middle-class urban residents. It is important to note
here that parents of the one-child migrants, at the time of the research, were not yet
elderly enough to need intensive care. However, the availability of non-familial care in
the near future should not be taken for granted.
This article aims to further the understanding of the twenty-first century Chinese
family contract by studying not only what family members do to reciprocate intergener-
ational support but also how they perceive their (expected) filial behaviour. Rather than
assuming that modernisation/globalisation and traditional family values are two opposing
elements (the former erodes the latter, the latter slows down the process of the former),
this research investigates how contemporary Chinese family contracts (mainly to do with
filial piety) are being reconfigured and renegotiated in “the age of migration” (Castles and
Miller 2009).
Chinese middle-class transnational families
Studies of affluent Chinese transnational families have been based largely on trans-
Pacific families: Chinese families from more developed regions in Asia (such as Hong
Kong, Singapore and Taiwan) migrating to North America and Australasian countries
(Lin 2011; Waters 2005; Chee 2003; Ong 1999). This migration included the
phenomenon of the “astronaut family”, where one parent accompanied the child to the
host country while the other parent (usually the father) stayed in the home country to
earn money and travelled regularly between his family and work (Tsong and Liu 2009;
Huang and Yeoh 2005; Ong 2003). Similarly, widely used terms like “Pacific shuttle”
and “parachute kids” (Ley 2010; Tsang et al. 2003; Zhou 1998) also reflected an
education-motivated, child-centred trans-Pacific migration arrangement. These family
members were described as being highly mobile, flexible “global citizens” (Ong 1999)
for whom notions of the “nation-state” became irrelevant (Yang 2011; Wong 2003).
Such narratives located the transnational dispersion of middle-class families within
“late capitalism” where the “speedup of all aspects of economic life” generated new flexible
production, consumption and accumulation of capital (Ong and Nonini 1997, p. 10).
People worldwide “no longer see their lives as mere outcomes of the givenness of things,
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but often as the ironic compromise between what they could imagine and what social life
will permit” (Appadurai 1996, p. 54). Although this approach explains the “new” Chinese
mobility as an active family capital-accumulating strategy, it risked over-simplifying
middle-class Chinese families’ transnational practice by assuming a similar (high) level of
flexibility and sustainability.
By pointing out the difference between Singaporean and other new East Asian
migrants, Lin (2011) argued for the “possibility of alternative realities within many
Chinese transnationalisms”. The rising participation of middle-class families from
China at the turn of the century has certainly further diversified the profile of the
new Chinese transnational families. Unlike trans-Pacific astronaut families, the typ-
ical pattern of the one-child transnational family in this study is that both mother
and father live in China while the only child lives overseas. Compared with the astro-
naut families, the one-child families have a lower level of transnational flexibility
given the lack of a sibling to share parental care in the long term. Following this, I
argue for a micro-level approach to examining Chinese families’ transnational mobil-
ity by focusing on the relationship between ageing parents and migrant children.
So far, approaches to Chinese transnationalism have largely regarded the parents as
supporters of the new Chinese mobility and their offspring as the beneficiaries, which
assumes an on-going parent-to-child transfer. However, intergenerational transfer is
not always a one-way process. Family support dynamics change as the two generations
age. What the literature lacks is a two-way perspective, which examines the sustainability
of Chinese transnationalism as family members grow older (including parents becoming
retired and elderly, as well as children leaving home and having families). Life cycle plays
a crucial role in determining individuals’ emotional/material needs and migration deci-
sions (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002; Lee 1966) and also transnational families’ migration
strategies (Waters 2011). In the case of the one-child transnational families, where parents
and only children are separated by distance and borders, the tension between the needs of
ageing parents and a child’s overseas settlement is likely to be increasingly accentuated.
Between China and the UK: the post-education transnational field
Migration from mainland China to the UK has sharply increased during the past two
decades (see Fig. 1). In 2012, China ranked as the top (non-EU) migrant-sending coun-
try to the UK for the first time (ONS 2013a). The arrival of the new Chinese migrants
from mainland China has changed previous Hong Kong (Cantonese) dominance of the
UK Chinese demographic. The percentage of the UK ethnic Chinese population origin-










Fig. 1 China-born residents in the UK (2011 Census)
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Students aged 16 and over made up 45 % of the Chinese who arrived between 2001
and 2011 (ONS 2013b). By 2012 China provided the largest number of international
students in UK universities, making up almost a third of non-EU students (Universities
UK 2014; Home Office 2013). Based on the relative young age of the arrivals it is rea-
sonable to assume that the majority belonged to the one-child generation in China who
were born after the late 1970s. In this study all respondents but one arrived in the UK
after 2000, and they were all below the age of 30 in the year of their arrival. The major-
ity of the sample extended their post-education stay by switching to working status and
most of these were working as professionals in various mainstream industries. Com-
pared to the previous Chinese migrants this cohort had greater socioeconomic upward
mobility in the UK. Compared to their counterparts in China, the overseas one-child
cohort was believed to have obtained “First World” affluence (Fong 2004) given that
overseas education was considered a “gateway to the ultimate goal of a life in a more
open and affluent Western society” (Bodycott and Lai 2012).
However, parents of these one-child migrants showed a lower degree of mobility
when compared to their counterparts in trans-Pacific families. Unlike middle-class par-
ents from Hong Kong and Singapore, for whom international migration had been a
central feature of their family history (Göransson 2009; Waters 2005; Skeldon 1994),
mainland Chinese parents were deeply rooted in their home community. The Chinese
border was closed during Mao’s regime, and private migration has been made possible
only since the 1980s (Liu 2011; Liu 2006). Administratively, the parents’ generation had
been embedded in the communist style Danwei (work unit) system, which monitored
its members’ work and life (Hu and Peng 2015). Almost all the respondents participat-
ing in this study were the first generation in the extended family (from their grandpar-
ents’ generation) to have gone abroad, which has widened the generation gap between
migrants and their parents.
In addition, the tightening of UK immigration policy during the past decade made
long-term settlement in Britain more difficult. Consequently and ironically, the “value”
of permanent British residency (possessed by the younger generation) was increased
and was more likely to be viewed as a “family asset” not to be easily given up. Indeed,
several respondents regarded “getting a British permanent residency permit” as an import-
ant part of their overseas achievement. This kind of space-bound capital accumulation
strategy reduced the transnational flexibility for both generations. Therefore, the contem-
porary middle-class migration pattern between China and the UK cannot be assumed to
be “circuits of transnational migration”, which was how Waters (2005) described middle-
class migration between Hong Kong and Canada. Rather, the UK-China “transnational
social field” (Levitt and Schiller 2004) is more stable and bounded by national borders.
Hence, it is likely to pose dilemmas for the two parties in renegotiating family obligations
and responsibilities.
Method
My empirical data derives from 40 semi-structured interviews (27 one-child migrants,
6 migrants with siblings, 7 sets of migrants’ parents) conducted in the UK and China
during 2013–2014. Snowball sampling was used in conjunction with online advertising.
These two strategies proved useful in overcoming the geographical barriers in reaching
out to the potential participants, who were dispersed throughout the UK and China.
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The 27 one-child migrants were interviewed first and then asked if they would connect
me to their parents in China. Eventually, seven sets of parents2 in China took part in
the research. Interviewing both child and parents from the same family is rare in trans-
national family research, largely because of the practical difficulty of accessing both
children and parents. The six migrants who had siblings were interviewed as a supple-
mentary resource to provide a point of comparison with the only-child families.
Interviews lasted between 1 and 3 h and were audio recorded. The word “children” is
used for the convenience of analysing the parent-child relationship; in fact, these mi-
grant “children” were between 22 and 38 years of age, and nearly a third of them had
British-born offspring. The parents of the migrant children I interviewed were aged be-
tween 51 and 68 years. At the point of interview the majority of parents had not
reached retirement; most were working as professionals and a few were business
owners. The majority of the parents were not elderly (or ill) enough to need intensive
care,3 but as parents continue to age, their need for physical care would become more
pressing. This study may not observe the outcome of the physical care arrangements,
but it captured how parents and children saw their roles in the intergenerational care
arrangement during the process of negotiation.
The sample comprised 20 women and 13 men, which may reflect the gender balance
among post-education Chinese migrants. While there is currently no reliable data on
the gender ratio among middle-class Chinese migrants in the UK, more Chinese
women than Chinese men graduated from UK higher education institutions between
2001 and 2011. Women outnumbered men in Master’s and undergraduate programmes
by a ratio of 1.5:1 in 2008/09 (Iannelli and Huang 2013).
The participants came from a variety of regions in China, which is in keeping with
what is known about the new mainland Chinese migrants: they not only came from
coastal migrant-sending regions like Shanghai and Guangdong (near Hong Kong) but
also from inland provinces which were not traditionally migrant-sending regions. The
migrants had lived in the UK for 1–13 years and were at different stages of their lives;
the samples included 5 postgraduate students and 27 post-education migrants; 14 were
married and 19 were unmarried.4 That the respondents were at different stages in their
career and marital status provided further material for analysing the impact of the life
cycle on transnational families.
Migrants’ perspective: transnational family challenges and responsibility shift
One-child migrants faced two challenges in terms of looking after their parents. The
first and more pressing matter is to do with coping practically with any emergency in
the life of the parents in China. As Ran (male, 27, software engineer) emphasised: “I
need to be able to go back within a few hours’ time, not the next day. In some emer-
gency situations it would be too late.” In comparison, Chuanli (male, 31, post-doctoral
researcher, has a sister) thought his sister’s physical proximity to their parents gave him
“peace of mind”. The other problem is the difficulty of having parents come to live with
the child in the UK because of immigration policy and concerns about parents’ well-
being in a new country. The British government has severely limited residency permits
granted to “elderly dependent relatives”5 who come for family reunification. Furthermore,
if parents were to settle in the UK, their lack of English, together with lifestyle changes,
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could constitute a potential threat to their psychological well-being by increasing
their dependency on their child, thereby reducing their own mobility.
To what extent did these transnational family challenges impact on migrants’ settle-
ment plans? It is important to look at this question together with other factors which
shape the on-going process of migration decision-making (Mosneaga and Winther 2013).
When the respondents arrived in the UK as students, few of them had a long-term settle-
ment plan. Migrants’ decision-making process usually evolves alongside significant life
events: study abroad, graduation/employment, relationship/marriage and becoming par-
ents. Alongside these significant decision-making points, external factors, especially to do
with job opportunities, migration policy and unexpected events, all had different levels of
impact on their decision to remain or to return to China.
The longer children remained in the UK, the more established their families and ca-
reers became, which meant that migrant children had more to lose when returning to
China. In other words, the economic and social capital one-child migrants accumulated
through overseas education and post-education experience may decrease following re-
turn migration. Unlike a Western university degree, whose “value” is transferable across
borders, other forms of “capital” were not always transferable, including (some aspects
of ) work experience, professional/social connections, and the quality of the migrant’s
family life in the host country.
As a result, married respondents generally expressed a stronger wish to settle in the
UK; unmarried respondents (single or in a relationship) tended to speak in favour of
returning to China. While career prospects were an important factor in respondents’
decision-making, two single men and one single woman saw parental needs as the
dominating factor and had planned to return to China solely because of it. By contrast,
the married migrants, especially those who had offspring, generally lived in the UK for
a longer period and were more established in the host society. They regarded the next
generation’s well-being in the UK as their primary responsibility.
It cannot, however, be assumed that the unmarried respondents were “more filial”
and the married respondents were “less filial”. Behind the differences in settlement
choices was the shift (and compromise) in family responsibilities that migrants experi-
enced before and after marriage. Compared to the unmarried respondents, the married
respondents had a very different way of seeing their role in migration decision-making:
responsibilities not only expanded from the natal family to their own nuclear families,
but sometimes also to the in-laws (especially if the spouse was also a one-child migrant).
As Demin (male, 33, lecturer) put it:
Any decision you make, is the result of compromises after taking all aspects into
consideration: not just your parents, but also your spouse, your child and your
spouse’s parents. All of them.
In this complex decision-making web, as described by Demin, the influence of paren-
tal needs had clearly (temporarily) lost its once dominating position. It is worth noting
here that the married women and men in the sample showed a similar pattern of com-
mitment transfer from parents to their own nuclear family. However, with 10 married
one-child women and only 2 married one-child men (in spite of attempts to recruit a
gender-balanced married sample), it was difficult to make any meaningful gender
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comparisons in terms of the impact of marriage on a one-child migrant’s sense of filial
piety.
The one-child migrants’ parents were relatively young, which enabled migrants to
focus on their own child(ren) rather than on the care needs of their parents. By the
time parents are elderly with decreased mobility (in their 70s and 80s), migrant chil-
dren will be in their late 40s to 60s with grown up child(ren). This useful spacing was
mentioned by a number of one-child respondents (married and unmarried) as a justifi-
cation for making parental care responsibility secondary to the needs of their own fam-
ily (or career) at the current stage of the respondents’ lives. The relative youthfulness of
Chinese parents avoided the caring “squeeze” which is more commonly found in British
families, in particular, among the higher educated women whose childbearing is delayed
and who are more likely to face the expectation of “two-way” (“downward” to children
and “upward” to parents) care (Agree et al. 2003).
This child-centred support flow put one-child migrants at an advantage in terms of
socioeconomic mobility in the host country. However, for adult children, not being able
to reciprocate parental investment in a direct and tangible way can result in serious
frustration. In interviewing older Taiwanese migrants (aged above 60) who came to the
USA when they were young, Sun (2014) found that these migrants’ care duties to their
elderly parents in Taiwan were shared by their siblings. However, in spite of sending
regular remittances to their parents and sibling, these migrants believed they still had
unfulfilled moral obligations. In a similar study, Italian migrants in New Zealand were
found to relinquish their claims to inheritance in order to compensate, financially and
morally, for their sibling’s larger share in parental care (Baldassar 2007).
However, unlike the Taiwanese and Italian migrants, the one-child migrants I inter-
viewed did not have siblings to share their parental long-term care responsibility nor did
they send remittances regularly. Parents’ financial independence (in some cases financial
affluence) made remittances from the UK to China redundant. On the contrary, financial
transfer from parents to children was based on the mutual understanding that the only
child was the sole beneficiary of parental assets. The oldest female respondent in the sam-
ple, Bolin (38, export manager) had a British husband, was the mother of two children
(aged 8 and 9) and was the recipient of continuing financial and childcare support from
her parents. While emphasising her commitment to settling in the UK and the priority of
her children, Bolin also expressed a high level of emotional and moral pressure:
They [Parents] want to give everything to me, but they fear to trouble me with
anything. I’d rather they loved themselves more than they loved me, I’d rather that
they have asked something from me…this love is too heavy.
Co-existing with the sense of guilt and indebtedness, the respondents also expressed
different levels of reflexivity on the more abstract elements of filial piety as a justifica-
tion for choosing career/family development in the UK. Making parents proud, as ex-
plicitly expressed by four one-child migrants (two women and two men), was also
highlighted as essential to being a filial child.
You need to ask yourself: “What do parents want from you?” Do they want you to be
with them, or do they want you to be independent with your own career and life? I
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used to think filial piety was to be near your parents and look after them. Now I
realise the importance of successfully managing your own life, not to let parents
worry about you, and make them proud. I think this is also a form of filial piety
(Wen, female, 33, married, legal assistant).
Such an understanding was in accordance with the traditional concept of filial piety
that “a child’s achievement is not only a matter of personal success, it brings honour to
the family” (Göransson 2009, p. 119). However, other aspects of filial piety, such as
physical closeness and material support, are compromised in the transnational one-
child families. It is not yet known whether one-child migrants’ responsibilities will shift
towards parents in the future. Both parents and children in this study were struggling
to come to terms with the new family contract in a fresh geographical setting. While
the only child felt the practical and moral dilemma of remaining in the UK instead of
returning for their parents, parents also had mixed emotions about the asymmetrical
intergenerational support.
Parents’ perspective: ambivalence towards the “new family contract”
A Chinese adage says “raise children for old age care” (yang er fang lao), which implies
a reciprocal principle of parents investing in children’s upbringing and well-being in ex-
change for old age care from children. The heavy investment in the only child observed
among working class Chinese families in the 1990s was explained by Fong as a way to
“enable singletons to achieve…success necessary for the fulfilment of their filial duties”
(Fong 2004, p. 157). However, middle-class parents interviewed in this study explicitly
spoke against this view by emphasising that such a concept belonged to “the previous
generation”, that it was “not necessary or realistic nowadays”, and, most of all, the fi-
nancially independent parents did not want to become a “burden” to their only child.
Such attitudes confirmed Zhang and Goza’s (2005) findings, a decade ago, that well-
paid professional parents did not want or plan to rely on their only child in their old
age; they were willing to invest most of their income on the child, a pension scheme
and a care home, but did not expect a financial return.
The middle-class parents in this study (and in Zhang and Goza’s study) were very
similar to their counterparts in Singapore: middle-class Chinese Singaporeans born in
the 1960s and 1970s, who Göransson (2009) described as the “sandwich generation”,
attained affluence as a result of the rapid economic growth in the late twentieth cen-
tury. “Sandwich” here does not mean the mid-age couple struggling between the needs
of the elderly and the young; the term refers to the generation between the “old tradi-
tions” and the “modern world”. Like parents in this study, the Singaporeans “sandwich
generation” in the twenty-first century enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle and were able to
provide high-quality material and educational resources for the next generation. Such a
lifestyle stood in sharp contrast to their childhood experience. When faced with “inter-
generational discontinuity” (Göransson 2009, p. 35), Singaporean parents used strat-
egies to manage generational difference in everyday interactions with their children and
their parents. However, parents in my study lacked the everyday physical and social
space to bridge the generational gap.
As Göransson pointed out, the so-called sandwich generation was a class-related
phenomenon and did not apply to all members of that age group. Likewise, in China,
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the middle-class parents were the minority of the generation born between the 1950s
and the 1960s. Furthermore, the number of middle-class parents whose only child
remained overseas made up an even smaller proportion of that generation. Therefore,
parents of one-child migrants became the “modern minority” in comparison to “the
more conventional majority” in their community.
Most parents interviewed in this study were aware of their “difference” from “other
parents”. For example, they promoted “modern elements” of family relations, such as a
more “open, democratic” parent-child relationship and a less dependent older gener-
ation, in contrast to their observation of more “traditional” families around them. How-
ever, the parents’ tendency to hide negative feelings from me (sometimes from their
child as well) may have obscured the other side of the “modern story”.
Given that filial piety is “everybody’s business” (Ikels 2004, p. 5), parents of one-child
migrants risked negative peer pressure in a society where the importance of family
members’ “physical closeness” was still pervasive. One mother cited her colleague’s
“half-joking” comment on the “side-effect of sending the only child abroad” to show
that by letting her daughter remain overseas, she became the “different” minority
among her peers. While parents may have promoted their “modernness” to me or took
pride in it to justify the transnational relationship with their child, there could be more
serious struggles between the “more modern individual” and conservative social norms
in the local community.
Zhaohui (female, 23, student) came from a small town in South China (north
Guangdong Province). Although its residents were officially categorised as urban citi-
zens, the town was geographically and socially located at the periphery of urban de-
velopment and a traditional (largely rural) social norm was still pervasive. Zhaohui
reported that some parents in her home town prevented their child from going to
university so that the child would not leave the parents. After her mother was paral-
ysed several years ago, instead of being a “filial daughter” and taking up the role as
her mother’s carer, Zhaohui came to do her Master’s degree in London and was deter-
mined to achieve high results:
In our small town everyone knows what everyone’s children are doing, they’d
compare with each other. I want my Dad to be able to tell others with pride when he
was asked about me…I know he suffered a great deal from the gossips.
Zhaohui’s father (56) became semi-retired from his job as an accountant in order to
look after his paralysed wife and his aged mother. When asked for his opinion about
his daughter being far away, he replied:
I had the chance to leave [the small town] when I was young, but I stayed for my
parents, now I regret it…It’s a different time now. It’s not good to tie your child to
you. I know some parents want their child near, but I have let the kite go loose. She
can fly as far as she wants.
This parental struggle with peer pressure was more likely to be found in more con-
servative regions in China (like Zhaohui’s home town), whereas parent respondents
from big cities tended not to report direct social pressure. However, in spite of the
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dominating positive feelings parents reported about the “generational leap” (Göransson
2009, p. 52), there was still a sense of disappointment among parents.
Ran’s (male, 27, software engineer) mother (51, businesswoman) encouraged her son
to study abroad and continue working in the UK. She expressed a great sense of satis-
faction about her son’s achievements but also used the word “unfair” when talking
about the changes in filial practices between generations:
Sometimes I said to my husband, that we are more or less the last generation that
need to materially support our parents for filial piety. We do not need the next
generation to materially support us when we are old and we are also left alone by the
next generation (Laugh). My generation is the most exploited. We need to look after
the previous generation, but the next generation is not going to look after us.
Because of the limited size of the parent sample, it was unclear to what extent par-
ents felt negatively about the generational difference. Nevertheless, the evidence from
the interviews indicated a degree of struggle in coming to terms with the generational
changes not only in comparison with the previous generation but also in comparison
with their peers in the same generation. However, parents expressed feelings of unfair-
ness and disappointment significantly less than the satisfaction they gained from their
child’s achievement and how they (parents) had contributed to it.
While children’s addition to family honour by being successful is also a form of filial
piety, transnational one-child families face a dilemma: migrant children’s careers and
their own nuclear families’ well-being were geographically bound to the UK. The chil-
dren’s success in the developed host country meant compromising physical care (and
some emotional care) towards parents in China. Therefore, in one-child households
separated by long distance, some criteria of filial piety came into conflict with others.
In such circumstances, distance plays a significant role in modifying filial obligations
and expectations.
Distance, intimacy and changing perception of filial piety
“Distance lends enchantment” (or “absence makes the heart grow fonder”)6; such prov-
erbs describe how interpersonal attraction may be enhanced by individuals being away
from each other. While a study of 63 dating couples in the USA supported such a claim
(Jiang and Hancock 2013), there is no similar research about parent-child relationships.
Nevertheless, evidence in this study suggested that both parents and children were
aware of the role distance played in smoothing their relationships. The majority of both
child and parent respondents indicated the importance of not living together under the
same roof. Both generations’ wish to live independently is not new. Surveys in the
1990s indicated urban Chinese residents’ support for parents and children to “live close
by but not necessarily together” (Ma et al. 1994; Hu and Ye 1991).
Different levels of tension with parents were reported among the migrants who for
some reason shared a house with their parents over a substantial period of time (for ex-
ample, when parents were helping to look after their grandchildren or when migrant
children went back to China for a long holiday). The causes of arguments ranged from
everyday nitpicking to disputes about child rearing. Conversely, not being able to see
parents often made co-presence more precious. Ran (male, 27, software engineer) had
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authoritarian parents, yet he felt much closer to his parents during each home visit:
“When you meet only two weeks a year, you tend not to argue with each other, you tend
to feel closer.” Chuanli (male, 31, post-doctoral researcher) who has a sister, also articu-
lated a similar feeling regarding parents: “When you see parents on a daily basis you won’t
treasure that feeling [between parent and child]. I appreciated filial piety more after I left
China.” Overseas children were likely to develop a romanticised outlook on the parent-
child relationship, therefore increasing the likelihood for them to support the notion of fil-
ial piety. Migrants’ emotional support for parents was a significant element of the changed
meaning of filial piety for them following overseas settlement.
Although the long distance between China and the UK limited the migrant children’s
practical support for their parents, they showed emotional support by practising “long-
distance intimacy”. The term “long-distance intimacy” was developed by Parreñas
(2005) to describe the transnational intergenerational relations between Filipino mi-
grant mothers and their young adult children left at home. As migration literature on
transnational intergenerational relationships tends to focus on the migrants’ relation-
ship with their younger family members, such as children, research rarely addresses “in-
timacy” with older generations of families who are also separated from the migrants.
Even less academic attention has been paid to middle-class migrants’ relationship with
their middle-class parents living in the home country.
“Empty nest” middle-class parents showed a significantly higher demand for emo-
tional than material support. The development of International Communication Tech-
nology (ICT) in the twenty-first century has been celebrated for “generating new ways
of living together and acting transnationally in the digital era” (Nedelcu 2012, p. 1339).
Migrants in this study reported using ICT to maintain “long-distance intimacy”. Both
parents and migrant children could message, talk, and video chat with each other on a
“smart phone” at a very low cost. Apart from a small number of respondents whose
parents sometimes had to work at a weekend, the majority kept a routine of video chat-
ting/telephoning with parents at least once a week at the weekends. The length of video
chatting/telephoning typically lasted for around 1 hour each time, as reported by
respondents. Video chatting happened more frequently among migrants who had
child(ren) as the parents also wanted to “see” the grandchild(ren). Furthermore, other
means of communication, like messaging (text or photo), took place even more fre-
quently; in some cases, the respondents reported daily communication with parents.
However, not all the respondents enjoyed this kind of frequent communication with
parents; a small number found such communication with parents psychologically de-
manding or practically difficult to balance. For example, Zhaohui (female, 23, student)
found it difficult to express intimate emotion to her father; Ran (male, 27, software en-
gineer) felt guilty: “if my Mum don’t call me, I’d forget to call her, then she’d be un-
happy about it.” Dahong (female, 27, market analyst) kept daily messaging with her
parents but said the content of the exchange was sometimes “boring” and “trivial”.
Nevertheless, in spite of the negative experience, these respondents still felt morally
obliged to fulfil their parents’ emotional needs by committing time and patience to
long-distance communication.
Long-distance intimacy did not only manifest itself in how often the child and par-
ents talked, or what they talked about but it also had to do with what was not said by
parents and children. The respondents rarely contacted parents for their own
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emotional support, i.e. when they felt sad or anxious, they tend to rely on their spouse
or friends (in the UK or in China) for emotional support. “Only tell parents good news”
was the “golden rule” mentioned frequently by the respondents; any emotional distress
expressed by the migrant child would also bring anxiety to parents, and thus it was
wiser not to reveal negative emotion to parents.
The golden rule of only tell good news was also practised by some of the parents of
one-child respondents. For example, the incidences of a close relative’s death or par-
ents’ own illness was not revealed to the child until a few months later. The earlier re-
mark from Bolin (female, 38, export manager), “they [parents] fear to trouble me with
anything”, also indicated the parental tendency to look after their child’s emotional
well-being by not becoming an emotional (and practical) liability. Because of the lim-
ited parent sample, it was not clear how common, or to what extent, parents hid their
negative emotions in their communication from their migrant child. Nevertheless, the
existing cases in this study showed the delicacy of long-distance intimacy: because of
the lack of alternative means to learn about each other’s life (e.g. physical visits), what
parent and child chose to include, or not to include, during their communications was
likely to have a greater psychological impact on each family member than in families
who are not separated by distance and borders.
How do parents perceive the implication of long-distance communication with their
child? Bolin’s parents regarded frequent telephone contact as a sign of their daughter’s
filial piety to them. Bolin’s mother cited an occasion as an example of her daughter’s
care for parents: Bolin shortened a Sunday family outing with her sons in order to get
back on time to video chat with her parents. Although Bolin’s parents took emotional
comfort from the indication that they were their daughter’s priority on that occasion,
they had tried nevertheless to “push Bolin away”. Bolin reported in her interview that
sometimes while she was online chatting with her mother, her mother would ask her to
stop the conversation and spend more time with her own children; thus, Bolin felt a
sense of “selfless care” from her parents.
In this way, the international daily communication became a “dynamic of intimacy”.
It was important for children to contact parents in spite of inconvenience to show their
filial piety, while it was also appropriate for parents to reject their child’s “sacrifice” and
not to impose parental emotional needs on children. Nevertheless, the children’s failure
to keep up with frequent communication caused parental anxiety or disappointment; as
a result, the children’s availability for international communication was vital to parents’
emotional well-being. Thus, the cycle continues: between one-child migrants and their
parents, it was the two parties’ “sacrifice” and “anti-sacrifice” pattern that drove the dy-
namic of the intergenerational intimacy.
Dai and Diamond observed in the 1990s that, compared to American culture,
which regarded limited responsibility from children to parents as the norm, Chinese
culture encouraged unlimited responsibility and devotion to parents or family
(1998). However, how parents and children perceive and discharge “unlimited re-
sponsibility” is clearly changing in the twenty-first century. An increase in investing
in the younger generation and a decrease in the taken-for-grantedness of care-in-
return of the older generation has been consistent across Asian societies (Lee 2010;
Göransson 2009; Croll 2006; Park et al. 2005). In the context of the middle-class
one-child transnational family, children had very limited material responsibilities
Tu The Journal of Chinese Sociology  (2016) 3:15 Page 13 of 17
towards parents, and future care expectations were unclear. For now, it is the willingness
to commit oneself to caring for parents’ well-being, not necessarily the observable
filial actions, that has been regarded by both generations as the priority of being
filial.
Conclusion
In the age of migration, the aspirations and opportunities to pursue transnational mo-
bility encouraged the movement of capital and population on a global level. Conse-
quently, more and more families from traditionally family-oriented societies find
themselves in a situation where parents and children are separated for a longer time
and by a greater distance.
One-child transnational families are a minority (and new) family type in the context
of a Chinese society which still regards “physical closeness” as the norm. Transnational
family members are under social pressure to compensate for the “physical separateness”
with a more pervasive emotional unity. Such emotional obligations of intergenerational
reciprocity may be less visible in terms of how migrants and their parents behaved, but
they still affected how they expressed their feelings about their (expected) filial
behaviour.
Parents’ and children’s ambivalence about their situation, suggested a family con-
tract in transition. First, in spite of evidence of a commitment shift after marriage in
the UK, one-child migrants still regarded being filial to their parents as a moral ob-
ligation. Second, parents of the one-child migrants were caught between a more
traditional reciprocal relationship with their own parents and a “reconfigured reci-
procity” (Sun 2014) expectation from their only child. Finally, both parents and mi-
grant children are the “minority” in their respective local societies. Separately, the
two generations had to develop coping strategies against social pressure in China
and in the UK. Therefore, the complex interpretation of family contract(s) was argu-
ably the outcome of both generations coming to terms with the changing family
form through a changed space (because of migration) and time (life cycle of family
members).
It is important to note that the filial piety migrant children referred to was by no
means static. When children were still in the phase of receiving support from their par-
ents, they were more likely to indicate a willingness regarding filial support (Schans
and de Valk 2011). Parents in this study were in reasonably good health, and their mi-
grant children were largely the recipients of parental financial and care support. It
should not be taken for granted that the offspring would be willing and able to return
the parent’s favour in the future. Therefore, the one-child generation and their parents
have had to adapt themselves to new rules and dynamics of intergenerational support
given their specific and likely future circumstances. In addition, when separated by long
distances and faced with possible permanent household separation, only children and
their parents faced unique challenges. There was no longer a standardised Chinese
family contract. The changing environment enabled families to evolve into distinctive
forms and acquire new mobilities which were formerly restricted because of economic,
political and social conditions. At the same time, families in transition had to re-
negotiate a new family contract.
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Endnotes
1The Chinese state encouraged families to sign a Family Support Agreement (FSA), a
voluntary contract between parents and adult children to provide support to parents,
since the 1980s. FSAs were signed primarily among rural families but could also be
found in some urban areas (Chou 2010). An amendment of The Law of The People’s
Republic of China on the Protection of Rights and Interests of the Elderly was enacted
on July 1, 2013 (The State Council of PRC 2012). The amendment made visiting or
calling parents regularly a legal obligation, and failure to do so could lead to a lawsuit.
However, the frequency of the home-visit was not specified. The law was considered
“educational” and served as a starting point of a lawsuit (Hatton 2013).
2The seven sets of parents include two cases where both the mother and the father
were interviewed (together), three cases where only the father was interviewed, and
two cases where only the mother was interviewed. Among the seven sets of parents,
five sets of parents had a daughter and two sets of parents had a son. The parent inter-
viewees came from south China (Guangdong Province), southeast China (Zhejiang
Province), north China (Liaoning Province, Shandong Province and Inner Mongolia)
and mid-west China (Sichuan Province).
3The minority of parents who suffered from illnesses such as diabetes and heart-
related problems were mainly looked after by their spouse. One case where Zhaohui’s
mother was paralysed and was looked after by the father is elaborated on in the paper.
4The married sample contains 12 women (8 married to a white British/EU citizen, 3
married to a fellow Chinese migrant, 1 married to a Chinese British who was brought
up in the UK) and 2 men (both married to a fellow Chinese migrant). The unmarried
sample includes migrants who are single (5 women and 8 men) or in a relationship (3
women and 3 men).
5To be eligible for long-term visa issued to “elderly dependent relatives”, according to
the Home Office, “you must prove that: You need long-term care to do everyday personal
and household tasks; the care you need is not available or affordable in the country you
live in; the person you’ll be joining in the UK will be able to support, accommodate and
care for you without claiming public funds for at least 5 years” (Home Office 2015).
6Both sayings are recorded in the Bible; the Book of Proverbs.
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